Public Policy and Market Reality: Analyzing the Unfunded Liability in the Kentucky Non-hazardous Employees\u27 Retirement System by Dudley, Kelly
University of Kentucky 
UKnowledge 
MPA/MPP Capstone Projects Martin School of Public Policy and Administration 
2007 
Public Policy and Market Reality: Analyzing the Unfunded Liability 
in the Kentucky Non-hazardous Employees' Retirement System 
Kelly Dudley 
University of Kentucky 
Follow this and additional works at: https://uknowledge.uky.edu/mpampp_etds 
 Part of the Policy Design, Analysis, and Evaluation Commons 
Right click to open a feedback form in a new tab to let us know how this document benefits you. 
Recommended Citation 
Dudley, Kelly, "Public Policy and Market Reality: Analyzing the Unfunded Liability in the Kentucky Non-
hazardous Employees' Retirement System" (2007). MPA/MPP Capstone Projects. 167. 
https://uknowledge.uky.edu/mpampp_etds/167 
This Graduate Capstone Project is brought to you for free and open access by the Martin School of Public Policy 
and Administration at UKnowledge. It has been accepted for inclusion in MPA/MPP Capstone Projects by an 
authorized administrator of UKnowledge. For more information, please contact UKnowledge@lsv.uky.edu. 
Public Policy and Market Reality:   
Analyzing the unfunded liability in the 
Kentucky Non-hazardous Employees’ Retirement System 
 
 
 
By: Kelly Dudley 
Martin School of Public Policy and Administration 
University of Kentucky 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Presented to: 
 
Dr. Dwight Denison 
Dr. Merl Hackbart 
Dr. Greg Hager 
Dr. Edward Jennings 
Dr. Ginny Wilson 
 2 
Executive Summary 
In 2006, an issue of serious concern to state legislatures was the long-term security of the 
defined benefits that state and local public pension plans promise to current and future retirees (Snell, 
2006).  Public pension systems are growing in terms of members and the benefits they offer to their 
members. Part of this group includes the estimated 77 million baby-boomers who will be living the 
next 20 to 30 years in retirement (Wharton, 2006). These dynamic changes are raising the burden 
public pension plans place on government operating budgets.  Expecting a large number of their 
employees to retire, public administrators are becoming more concerned about meeting the retirement 
pledges to their public employees and also maintaining a desired level of public services demanded by 
their taxpayers (Mattoon, 2006).   
In a study of 58 state pension systems, Wilshire Associates found that 84% were under-funded 
in 2005 by an estimated $157.1 billion (Wilshire and Associates, 2006).     
The pension unfunded liability problem has been gaining attention in the Commonwealth of Kentucky.  
During February 2007, Governor Ernie Fletcher passed an executive order to establish a task force that 
would examine ways to restore the financial health of the state’s two main public retirement systems, 
the Kentucky Retirement System (KRS) and the Kentucky Teachers Retirement System.  As of June 
30, 2006 the unfunded liability for KRS was $11.9 billion (excluding the County Retirement systems), 
$3 billion more than the General Fund operating budget for fiscal year 2007.2  The unfunded liability is 
a measure of the degree to which the cost of benefits that have been earned by members to date but not 
yet paid exceeds the value of the assets available to pay for benefits.  These benefits are contractual 
obligations of the Commonwealth and are protected by statute as well as the state constitution (KRS, 
2006).   
Several states, including like Kentucky, are trying to address their unfunded liabilities and 
escalating costs before the real hardships occur.  Severely under-funded public pension systems have 
caused some governments to reduce their provision of public services.  Municipal bond ratings and, 
therefore, government’s potential to borrow funds has also been negatively affected. In addition, if the 
unfunded liability problem continues to be deferred by policymakers it will raise the employer 
contribution rates needed to pay for future pension liabilities and consume an even larger portion of 
their operating budgets increasing the financial burden on future taxpayers. To avoid these negative 
consequences, public administrators are developing policies aimed at funding their pension systems at 
actuarially sound levels. 
This paper analyzes how the cyclical market affects the funding levels of public pension 
systems and evaluates funding strategies public pension systems can use to prepare for the future.  I 
analyze the impact of different investment management policies on the KERS Non-hazardous system 
and the feasibility of issuing pension obligation bonds to pay off the unfunded liability.  The first 
section provides an overview of the structure of public pension plans, describes how these systems are 
funded, and identifies the factors that can affect their funding level.  The next section discusses causes 
of unfunded liabilities and their implications.  The third section discusses potential solutions various 
states have implemented to address unfunded liabilities and improve the funding of their plans.  The 
fourth section looks at the Kentucky Employees’ Retirement Non-hazardous System's unfunded 
liability and analyzes the specific conditions that caused it.  The fifth section discusses my analysis 
with the data, methodology and results discussed within each subsection.  In the last section, I discuss 
various policy implications associated with my analysis and offer recommendations for improving 
public pension funding. 
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 The combined unfunded liability of KRS’s five separate systems was an estimated $18.8 billion as of June 20, 2006.  This data was reported in KRS’s 
Comprehensive Annual Financial Report.  Kentucky’s General Fund operating Budget was $8.8 billion for fiscal year 2007.  
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Background of Public Pension Systems 
There are two general types of pension plans, defined benefit and defined contribution.  In a 
defined-benefit plan, the employer guarantees a specified dollar amount to be received in retirement.  
The benefit is based on a formula that usually incorporates the employee’s salary, years of service, age 
at retirement, and a multiplier known as a benefit factor.  Most state plans use the employee’s highest 
three to five years of salary in the benefit calculation.  In addition, an employee normally has to be 
vested in the plan for a certain number of years before they are entitled to their benefit.  Finally, the 
initial amount of the individual’s check is usually adjusted annually for the effects of inflation 
(NASRA, 2006). 
Using an example, the defined benefit for an Illinois State employee retiring at age 60 with a 
final average salary of $45,000 and 30 years of service is calculated by multiplying the employee’s 
years of service (30) by his final average compensation ($45,000) and multiplying that number by 
Illinois’ benefit factor of 1.67%.  This yields an initial retirement benefit of $22,545, which will be 
paid for the rest of that retiree’s life (Hynes, 2006). 
In a defined-contribution plan an individual investment account is maintained for each 
employee.  The benefit in a defined contribution plan is determined by the amount contributed to the 
account by the employer and employee and the investment returns earned by the account contributions.  
In a defined contribution plan, the employer contribution is specified and guaranteed.  However, the 
future annual income is not guaranteed under a defined contribution plan as it is in a defined benefit 
plan.  Therefore, the value of employee’s investment (and therefore, the amount available for annual 
withdrawal) can fluctuate depending on the returns to investment on the contributions to the account.  
At retirement, the employee can withdraw the total lump sum, have it converted to a lifetime annuity, 
or receive it in a certain number of periodic payments.  A hybrid plan is another type of plan that is 
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gaining popularity among states.  The hybrid plan combines both types of plans and allows the 
employee to recieve a relatively smaller guaranteed annual amount through a defined benefit plan but 
requires the employee to supplement that benefit with what is earned from contributions to a defined 
contribution plan (NCSL, 2006, NASRA).    
In Michigan, the state is required to contribution 4 percent of an employee’s salary to his  
individual account.  The employee is not required to make a contribution but may receive a dollar-for-
dollar match if they contribute up to 3 percent of their salary.   If an employee wants to contribute 
above 3 percent he can, but the state will only match the first 3 percent of the employee’s contribution.  
He can choose among different investment options for the funds in his account.   His retirement benefit 
depends on the total contributions to the fund and the earnings made on the selected investments 
(NCSL, 2006). 
A key difference between these plans is party that assumes the investment risk.  In defined-
benefit plans, the employer is responsible for deciding how much to contribute to the plan annually and 
how the contributions will be invested.  The employer absorbs both the gains and losses associated 
with investment returns while guaranteeing payment of the retirement benefit calculated by the 
formula. Conversely, the employee is responsible for the investment management of their own funds in 
the defined-contribution plan.  If investment returns on the pension funds are below expected levels, an 
increase in employer contributions will be necessary to cover the loss.  Since the employer contribution 
is fixed for defined-contribution plans, the pension liability problem does not exist (Peng, 2004; 
NASRA, 2006). 
According to the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, about ninety percent of state and local 
government employees participate in a defined benefit.  States such as Alaska, Colorado, Montana, and 
Florida have elected to offer a defined contribution plan in the past six years (NASRA, 2006; NCSL. 
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2006).   Over the last few decades, more employers have began offering defined contribution plans for 
reasons like portability of plan benefits for employees who may switch jobs, shifting the investment 
risk to employees by allowing them to select and manage the investments in their account, and because 
these plans require less oversight and regulation from the employer or plan trustees since employees 
assume most of the responsibility for their accounts.  I will discuss later the experiences of states that 
have switched from their traditional defined benefit plan to a defined contribution plan.  Since the 
majority of public employees participate in a traditional defined benefit plan, the remainder of my 
paper will apply to this popular type of plan (NASRA, 2006; NCSL, 2006). 
How Public Pension Systems are Funded 
Pension funds can be thought of as a financial account where the contributions are saved and 
invested for payment of employment benefits at some point in the future.  Most of the assets needed to 
fund the future liabilities of the pension plan are accumulated during the working life of the employee. 
Souces of Public Pension     
Income Fiscal Year 1983-2002
Investment Earnings
62%
Employee 
Contributions
12%
Employer 
Contributions
26%
                                                                     
Source: National Association of Retirement Administrators 2002 
 
 
The main three assets in a public pension plan are employee contributions, employer 
contributions, and the investment returns on those contributions.  According to the National 
Association of Retirement System Administrators, public pension systems collected $2.7 trillion 
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dollars in income in 2002 (NASRA, 2002). Employee contributions made up 12 percent of that 
income, while employer contributions and investment earnings made up 25 and 62 percent respectively 
(NASRA, 2006).  
In 2004, ninety percent of public pension plans required employees to contribute some of their 
own earnings to the retirement account.  The employee contribution rate is usually set by law and does 
not vary.  The 2005 Public Fund Survey on state and local retirement systems reported a median 
employee contribution rate of 5 percent (Brainard, 2005).3   
Employer contribution rates are typically either set by statute or based on an actuarial 
valuation. An actuarial valuation uses a cost method that estimates the present value of benefits to be 
payable in the future considering employee service to date.  This method assigns some equal benefit 
amount to each year of accrued, actual, and expected future service.  The actuarial accrued liability is 
allocated to past service.  The actuarial accrued liability is a cost that should currently be fully covered 
by the assets in the account or fund.  If this liability is not covered by the available assets it is known as 
the unfunded actuarial accrued liability (UAAL).  The normal cost is the cost assigned to the benefits 
accruing during the current year for normal retirements.  This is also known as the actual cost and is 
expressed as a percentage of payroll.  The future normal cost is the expected benefits for future service 
that will need to be funded in the future.  These are the three cost components considered by the 
employer when determining funding methods (Mason, Brainard, Langer, Young and Ross, 2004).   
  The employee and employer contributions are placed in a pension trust fund where they are 
invested to earn the hoped-for actuarial investment rate of return.  The investment returns on the 
contributions are a critical component of public pension income as shown in pie chart on page five.   
                                                          
3
 The Public Fund Survey represents approximately eighty-eight percent of state and local government 
retirement systems. 
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Factors that affect the funding levels of Public Pension Systems 
As stated in the previous section, a fund with assets that are less than accrued liabilities is 
considered underfunded.  The amount by which the liabilities exceed the assets is called the unfunded 
liability.  A public pension system’s funding level and, therefore, the size of the system’s unfunded 
liability, is affected by the growth of the pension fund’s assets and liabilities.  This section discusses 
the impact of the investment returns and employer contributions on asset levels.  
Investment returns are a significant source of income for public pension systems.  The 
investment and asset allocation strategy used by the trustee of the pension fund determines the level of 
investment returns the fund achieves.   When a government has a conservative investment strategy, its 
portfolio has a higher percentage of low-risk instruments such as treasury securities.  Because these 
securities are considered low-risk they carry a lower yield than other securities which might prevent 
the funds from realizing the actuary's projected earnings depending on how the market performs.  On 
the other hand, when a government adopts an aggressive investment strategy its portfolio has a higher 
percentage of high-risk instruments with higher yields like equitable securities.  The key to asset 
allocation is diversification so that the portfolio achieves the desired level of earnings for a bearable 
amount of risk to the employer (Peng, 2004).   
During the 1990’s, states started investing a greater percentage of their investment portfolios in 
equity securities.  To their advantage, the shift in asset allocation and the bull market of that period 
improved funding levels of public pension funds during the period because it substantially increased 
the valuation of the assets held in these funds.   However, the downturn of the market between 2000 
and 2002 caused several systems to lose significant investment value, which dramatically reduced their 
asset to liability ratios (Mason, Brainard, Langer, Young and Ross, 2004).  Many states are facing 
major increases in employer contribution rates to cover the losses their systems suffered in asset value 
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from their poor market experience.  The Wilshire Report on State Retirement Systems reported state 
pension portfolios had an average allocation to equities of 67.7 percent and 32.3 percent fixed-income 
securities in 2005 (Wilshire, 2005).  While the market downturn had a major effect on many state 
system, this experience may have also taught these systems to prepare for future cyclical swings in the 
market (Peng, 2004). 
Growth in liabilities is dependent upon the level of benefits payable to current and future 
retirees estimated by the actuary.  Actuarial assumptions play a critical role in pension funding, since 
they estimate the liability or the long-term cost of defined benefit pensions.  Among the many 
assumptions made by the actuary are the number of employees vested, expected mortality rates, cost of 
living adjustments, employee withdrawals, and the average work life of the employer's labor force 
(Livingston, 1996).  The actuary makes three main economic assumptions in his analysis. The actuary 
first projects the amount of an individual's future benefit by estimating the salary increases until 
retirement.  Second, the actuary estimates the rate of inflation for each year after retirement until death.  
Third, after the final benefit is determined he assumes the rate at which he will discount the benefit 
back to obtain the present value (Hustead, 2001).   
The discount rate represents the expected rate of investment return on the pension fund until the 
employee’s retirement. Mahoney suggests using a discount rate that is as close to the reality of the 
market as possible for determining the accurate actuarial level of contributions needed (Mahoney).  
According to the efficient market theory, “financial prices exhibit a random walk behavior and thus 
can not be predicted with consistency.”  Conversely, research on “market timers” from Timers Digest 
and Hulbert Financial Digest shows that some timers have been realiable in their predictions about the 
market.4  The Public Fund Survey says the median discount rate assumption of most pension plans is 8 
                                                          
4
 Timers Digest and Hulbert financial digest track the performance of market timers over thirty year periods and publish 
information on “timers” recommendations and signals.  
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percent although the number of plans using an assumption lower than the median have increased 
(NASRA, 2005).  Hustead considers between 8 percent and 7.75 to be a very conservative assumption 
about the market (Hustead, 2001).   
 To illustrate the effect of the discount rate, return to the example of the Illinois state employee 
with the annual retirement benefit of $22,545.  If the State of Illinois wanted to find out how much it 
would have to invest today for 30 years assuming a future investment rate of 8 percent, it could 
determine the present value of the annual benefit using the 8 percent discount rate which is $3,577.  If 
the discount rate is changed to 6 percent, the present value of the benefit changes to $6,267.  Therefore, 
the higher the discount rate assumption (expected investment return) the lower the investment needed 
today.     
The discount rate is probably the most controversial assumption in the evaluation because of its 
impact on the liability or cost of plan to the employer.   If the actuary assumes a market upswing and 
predicts the pension fund will have strong investment returns in coming years, he will assume a higher 
discount rate and reduce the present value liability which reduces future required employer 
contributions.  This assumes that the assets would earn substantial investment returns from the market 
and the higher value of the assets will cover the fund’s estimated pension liabilities (Hustead, 2001).  
The level investment returns is also dependent upon the asset allocation of the pension fund’s 
investment portfolio.  If the actuary is wrong and market does worse than expected the plan would be 
at risk due to the failure of the fund’s assets to earn projected level of investment returns and the 
reduced employer contributions (Mahoney, 2002). 
The Funding Decision 
The division between who decides the required contribution to cover future benefits, how the 
contributions should be invested, and the actual amount the employer will contribute can add 
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inconsistency to the pension funding decision if the benefit policy, investment policy, and funding 
policy are not somewhat integrated.  The trustee of a pension plan, with assistance from the actuary, is 
generally responsible for deciding the employer’s actuarial contribution rate-the employer’s 
contribution rate determined by actuarial valuation.5  An investment committee assists the trustee with 
the investment strategy and asset allocation of the funds.  But the funding decision is left to the 
discretion of the policymaker (Useem and Hess, 2001).    
 Some employers fully fund their defined benefit plans at levels where the value of the current 
fund assets is equal to the estimated benefit liabilities of current and future retirees.  While employers 
should strive to meet their required contribution rates to fully fund state pension funds, it is often 
difficult, especially if their state is experiencing a budget deficit.  Regardless of poor market 
performance or whether their actuary's contribution rate is sufficient, employers are still responsible for 
funding pension obligations (Mason, Brainard, Langer, Young and Ross, 2004).  
 Larry Langer with Gabriel, Roeder, Smith & Company, a benefit and actuary consulting firm, 
says when a plan is underfunded "we make sure that the normal cost amount is contributed and then we 
try and pay off the sliver of unfunded actual accrued liability that is not yet covered by the assets."  
This is known as the annual required contribution (ARC).   The Governmental Accounting Standards 
Board (GASB) requires governments to pay off their unfunded liability over a thirty-year period.  
Generally, governments will amortize the unfunded liability within the thirty-year limit and include the 
amortization payment on the unfunded liability in their annual required contribution (ARC) (Mason, 
Brainard, Langer, Young and Ross, 2004). 
Fiscal stress is the most cited reason for pension contribution deferment by government 
employers.  When money is tight and times are tough employers typically do not view pension 
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  The actuarial contribution rate includes the normal cost for the current fiscal year and the amortization payment on the 
unfunded liability.  This rate is usually expressed as a percentage of projected payroll. 
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obligations to be as urgent as other budgetary demands for general fund dollars.  In those situations, 
demands for public safety, Medicaid, or education can be greater (Peng, 2004).  While deferment of 
employer contributions may seem irresponsible, most employers use deferment as a countercyclical 
budget tool (Peng, 2004; Mahoney, 2002; Mason, Brainard, Langer, Young and Ross, 2004; Mitchell 
and Smith, 1994).  
Mitchell and Smith discuss how the cyclical nature of the economy  to cyclical changes in 
government budgets and financial markets.  This makes pension fund management an important factor 
in sustaining a structural budget balance during the course of business cycle.  For example, a slow 
economic growth rate can cause revenue shortfalls for governments.  Instead of adopting policies to 
increase taxes or cut services a government may choose to reduce or defer pension contributions.  Of 
course, since the cyclical deficit is a short-term problem and deferment is a short-term solution, there is 
an expectation that the employer will pay back the defered amount by paying more than the required 
contribution when the economy improves and surplus funds are available.  If the deficit is structural- 
created by the government allowing spending growth to exceed revenue growth-deferment is 
discouraged because it exacerbates the real problem by not addressing the causes of the structural 
deficit.  When continuous deferment is used, the employer’s pension liability increases even higher 
since the accrued unpaid portion or unfunded liability compounds with interest (Mitchell and Smith, 
1994; Peng 2004). 
In most cases where there is a cyclical budget surplus and the pension plan is over-funded, 
governments find it difficult to set aside savings.  For politicians, its much more tempting to offer 
benefit enhancements or reduce the employer contribution rate. Robert Snell of the National 
Conference of State Legislatures conducts a survey of legislative changes in state pension funds.  His 
responses showed that many states increased benefit levels and reduced employer contributions during 
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the market expansionof the 1990’s (Snell, 2003).  Often, employers do not recognize the implications 
of their actions.   
The reduction in employer contributions and increases in benefits reduces the fund’s asset 
levels.  If the market declines, the weight of the pension bill or liability will be harder to carry and 
result in an even larger increase in employer contributions.  Therefore, Peng advises employers to 
handle surpluses with caution since the cyclical nature of the economy makes it likely that can ensure a 
deficit will follow at some point in the future (Peng, 2004).   
Implications of Unfunded Pension Systems 
An unfunded liability is not always necessarily a sign of fiscal concern.  It’s only when the 
fund’s liabilities create fiscal stress for the employer that it should begin to worry.  Still, having an 
under-funded pension plan has several implications, which can have a significant impact on 
government operating budgets.  These implications include opportunity costs of lost investment 
returns, violation of the intergenerational equity principle, potential crowding-out of public services, 
and the possibility to negatively impact a government’s municipal bond rating and borrowing costs 
(Mahoney, 2002; Mason, Brainard, Langer, Young and Ross, 2004; Mitchell and Smith, 1994, Peng, 
2003).  
 When an employer fails to make contributions to the pension fund or their contribution does 
not meet the required contribution rate determined by the actuary, the projected level of investment 
returns may not be realized which reduces the fund’s assets.  A shortfall occurs when an employer 
doesn’t contribute the actuarial required rate.  Not only does the employer lose investment returns on 
what it didn’t contribute, but that amount compounds over future periods.  The lost investment 
earnings represent the employer’s opportunity cost for not making the required contribution. This is 
also the amount that would have yielded a reduced dependency on future tax dollars.  It is important to 
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fund pension systems now rather than later because the effects of compounding mean that the longer 
governments wait to fund their systems, the higher the opportunity cost of lost investment returns 
(Peng, 2003; KRS, 2006; Mahoney, 2004). 
 Parry Young of Standard's and Poor's says bond rating agencies pay attention to two main 
measures of pension fund fiscal health during the credit rating process.  The first measure is the funded 
ratio which is the ratio of a government’s net assets to its accrued liabilties.  The greater the percentage 
of the funded ratio the higher the funding level of the pension system.  The second measure is the 
relative size of the unfunded liability over time.  Young says that rating agencies consider unfunded 
liabilities as much as they consider debt when evaluating the fiscal health of a municipality or state 
employer and the agencies examine the historical trend of the employer’s pension funded ratio as well 
as their employer contribution history, considering the age of the plan (Mason, Brainard, Langer, 
Young and Ross, 2004; Young, 2005).     
 Underfunding the system also puts pressure on operating budgets by increasing the amount of 
the pension bill that will have to be paid by future taxpayers.  Mahoney discusses the ethical 
implications of deferring pension contributions and liabilities. Mahoney states that employer 
contribution deferment violates the principal of intergenerational equity-the generation that benefits 
from a particular public service should be the generation that pays for it.  When public officials decide 
to provide more public services to the current generation by under-funding their public pension 
systems, there is a possibility that the future generation will have to pay the price for the older extra 
generation’s services.  The later generation will pay in the form of higher tax bills or a lower level of 
public services.  He uses philosopher John Rawls’ “just-savings theory” and GASB standards to argue 
that fully funding pension systems should be a responsibility of the public administrator (Mahoney, 
2002). 
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Improving the Accountability of Public Pension Funds 
The Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) of 1974 set standards for corporate 
disclosure of pension fund information and set rules for vesting, restrictions on underfunding, and 
investment of pension funds.  The Pension Benefit Guarantee Corporation was also established as part 
of this Act to insure private pension funds against underfunding.  ERISA does not apply to public 
sector employers.  This is the reason public employers can defer pension fund contributions, shifting 
the financial burden to future taxpayers (Lamb, 1993; Mahoney, 2002).   
In an effort to increase accountability of public pension funds the Governmental Accounting 
Standards Board requires public pension systems to report on their plan's funded status.  GASB No. 5 
Disclosure of Pension Information by Public Employee Retirement Systems and State and Local 
Governmental Employers standardizes the measure of the pension obligation, requires disclosure of 
annual trends of specific pension funding ratios and disclosure of the assumption used by the actuary in 
calculating the pension obligation.  The elements of GASB No. 5 have made public pension systems 
more comparable across states and municipalities (Lamb, 1993; GASB 1986).    
A standard measure of pension liabilities reported on governmental financial statements is the 
pension benefit obligation.6  The pension benefit obligation can be thought of as the actuarial valuation 
of benefits owed.  GASB requires public employers to report their pension funding levels using 
different measures such as the Funded Ratio.  Rating agencies use the funded ratio as an indicator of 
the public pension plan’s fiscal health as mentioned in the previous section (Brainard, 2004; Lamb, 
1993).  The National Association of Retirement System Administrators considers a Funded Ratio of 80 
percent to be fiscally healthy (NASRA, 2006).  
                                                          
6
 This measure represents the present value of benefits estimated to be payable in the future considering employee service to date of actuarial valuation, 
calculated by attributing some equal benefit amount to each year of accrued, actual, and expected future service.  Expected benefit enhancements or salary 
increase projections are accounted for in the benefit calculation.  The pension benefit obligation includes the retirees and beneficiaries currently receiving 
benefits, terminated employees entitled to benefits but not yet receiving them, employee contributions, investment income accumulated, and vested and 
non-vest employees employer financed share.  Governments must also estimate net assets with their pension benefit obligation. 
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The City of San Diego’s unfunded liability for its pension plan was well on its way to $2 billion 
by 2009.  In 2006, the city disclosed misleading information in official statements for municipal bond 
offerings and to credit rating agencies about its pension and retiree health care obligations and the 
amount of assets available to pay for those obligations.  The bond offerings raised over $260 million 
from investors.  The SEC issued an Order which stated that the city failed to fairly disclose to bond 
investors that it hand been intentionally under-funding its pension plan, putting at risk its ability to 
make the promised future debt service payments.  The city was sanctioned for committing securities 
fraud by misleading bond investors about its financial solvency.  San Diego provides an example of the 
greater attention being paid to the  accountability of public pension systems (SEC, 2006). 
How states are addressing funding levels 
 A review of pension and retirement plan enactments by state legislatures in 2006 indicates that 
state governments are using different approaches to address the under funding of their pension funds.  
States like New Jersey and Illinois have issued pension obligation bonds as a way to finance their 
unfunded liabilities.  Another approach for governments that are trying to reduce their risk of 
unexpected costs is to convert from their traditional defined benefit plans to a defined contribution plan 
or a hybrid plan.  Many have increased contributions to their pension plans and have created 
stabilization accounts to try and set aside extra money to cover shortfalls.  Others are cutting or 
reducing benefit levels for new hires in order to drive down their future pension costs, as well as 
prohibiting benefit enhancements or cost-of-living-adjustments until their pension plans reach a certain 
level of funding.  These approaches vary in risk and savings (Snell, 2005; Snell, 2006).   
Pension obligation bonds have been used by some states and municipalities to pay for a portion 
or the entire cost of their unfunded liability in an attempt to reduce annual pension costs.  When the 
bonds are issued, the proceeds are immediately placed in the retirement plans and then invested.  The 
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objective is to earn a higher rate of return on the bond proceeds than the interest rate that is paid to 
service the bonds.  Because of this arbitrage transaction, the employer will realize interest cost savings 
in the form of lower payments for debt service on the bonds than the payments the employer would 
have paid to amortize the unfunded liability.  However, this strategy involves interest rate risk.  If the 
market does not reach the assumed investment rate of return over the long-term, the rate of return may 
then become lower than the interest rate paid on the bond.  Therefore, the uncertainty of the market 
makes it hard to predict whether the outcome of the bond issue or other financing strategies will be 
successful in producing net savings for the employer (Burnham, 2003; Snell, 2006). 
Another pension cost-reducing approach is for a state to covert from a defined benefit plan to a 
defined contribution or a hybrid plan.  Studies show that switching to a defined contribution plan can 
produce savings to the employer in the long-term and increased costs in the short term.  These costs 
and savings are dependent on the level of difference between contributions and liabilities between the 
new and old plans.  For instance, several government employers switch to the defined contribution 
plan to shift their risk to the employee since they guarantee the benefit under the defined benefit plan 
and that benefit can vary.  With the defined contribution plan, the employer's contribution is fixed and 
does not change.  Switching to a defined contribution plan does not eliminate an unfunded liability.  
The employer will still need to address any accrued liabilities in addition to the costs related to 
implementing the new plan (NSCL, 2006; Reason Foundation, 2005).    
 Reducing or eliminating the level of benefits is another way states have tried to reduce costs.  
Most pension plans are inviolable contracts protected by state statute and the state and federal 
constitutional law.  This means policymakers can not modify the benefits for existing retirees or 
employees.  The only alterations they can make to the pension plan structure are for new hires.  Any 
savings from benefits changes will not occur until the new employees that are affected by the benefit 
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changes make up a large percentage of the employer's workforce.  The Missouri legislature considered, 
but did not pass legislation to prohibit cost-of-living-adjustments and benefit enhancements in plans 
that are less than 80 percent funded (Snell, 2006).  
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Background of Kentucky's Public Employees’ Retirement Systems 
 The Kentucky Retirement System (KRS) consists of five main separate systems:  
 Kentucky Employees Retirement System (KERS) for Non-hazardous employees  
 Kentucky Employees Retirement System (KERS) for Hazardous employees 
 County Employees Retirement System (CERS) for Non-hazardous employees 
 County Employees Retirement System (CERS) for Hazardous employees 
 Kentucky State Police System (KSP)  
As shown above KERS and CERS have separate systems for non-hazardous and hazardous 
employees.  KERS was established in 1956 by the state legislature. The CERS was established in 1958 
and the State Police System was established in 1960. When the systems were established there were 
16,000 participants in the state system, 2,617 participants in the county system, and 415 uniformed 
state troopers.  Today, there are over 300,000 active, inactive and retired members in all the systems 
combined.  Each system offers a defined-benefit pension as well as health insurance benefits to its 
participating members (KRS, 2006).   
The funded ratio for all systems has been declining since 2000, at when the systems were more 
than fully funded.  Table 1 shows that KERS Non-hazardous’ funded ratio decreased by 80 percentage 
points from 140 percent to 60 percent in 2006.  The funded ratio for CERS Non-hazardous was 83.6 
percent in 2006, the highest for all five systems.7 
According to KRS’ actuarial report for 2006, the unfunded liability for the pension fund of all 
systems combined was $5.37 billion.  As indicated by Table 2, KERS Non-hazardous had the highest 
unfunded liability and accounts for 67% of KRS’ total pension unfunded liability.  
 
                                                          
7
 In Wilshire Associates 2006 Report on State Retirement Systems, the average national funded ratio for state pension 
systems was 87%. 
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Table 1: KRS Pension Funds Actuarial Fund Ratio as of FY ended June 30,2006 
 
Fiscal Year 
KERS Non-
Hazardous 
KERS 
Hazardous 
State Police 
System 
County Non-
Hazardous 
County 
Hazardous 
2000 139.6% 138.2% 136.4% 156.9% 133.3% 
2001 125.7% 126.8% 128.1% 146.3% 124.5% 
2002 110.4% 116.9% 115.3% 129.6% 111.9% 
2003 97.4% 108.1% 99.6% 119.7% 97.8% 
2004 85.1% 98.4% 88.0% 105.1% 88.8% 
2005 73.6% 92.3% 77.1% 94.0% 80.9% 
2006 60.0% 84.1% 66.6% 83.6% 75.0% 
 
Source: KRS 2006 CAFR. 
Table 2: KERS Non-hazardous  FY 2006 Unfunded Liability on                                  
Actuarial Value of Assets for Pension Funds 
KRS System Unfunded Liability Percentage of                         
Total Unfunded Liability 
KERS Non-hazardous 3,600,739,924 67% 
KERS Hazardous 80,671,711 2% 
KSP 172,466,101 3% 
County Non-hazardous 1,016,675,131 19% 
County Hazardous 505,067,753 9% 
KRS Total $5,375,620,620  
Source: KRS 2006 CAFR.. 
 
The conditions that created the unfunded liability in Kentucky are similar to the conditions that 
affected the solvency of other state pension systems. There are three main issues discussed in this 
section:  
 Reductions in employer contributions 
 Lower than expected investment returns due to the market decline 
 Benefit enhancements enacted by the legislature 
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                                  Figure A: Historic Trend of conditions impacting the growth of
     KERS Non-hazardous Pension Fund's Unfunded Liability 1993-2005
 
Source: Data for Figure provided in KRS Actuarial Reports and CAFRs for Fiscal Years 1990-2006. Dollar amounts for 
Employer contributions were calculated using projected payroll data and employer contribution rates. 
 
Reductions in Employer Contributions  
 Figure A shows the historic trend of employer contributions scaled on the right axis, and the 
unfunded accrued actuarial liability, the total accrued actuarial liability, and actuarial value of assets 
scaled on the left axis. Note the two sharp declines in general fund contributions in 1999 and 2002.  A 
likely reason for the reduced employer contributions is the favorable market experience prior to 2001 
which led to higher than expected investment returns on the fund’s assets above the actuary’s assumed 
rate of return of 8.25 percent.  The investment returns after the mid-nineties reduced the unfunded 
liability by an estimated $1.93 billion and thus, lowered the required employer contributions needed to 
fund the pension plan. 
In recent years, the legislature has contributed below the KRS’ Board of Trustees’ requested 
employer contribution rates.  These reductions result in shortfalls that come with an opportunity cost of 
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lost contributions and investment returns.  Not only does this increase the system’s unfunded liability, 
but it also likely increases future employer contribution rates.  The stock market decline had a major 
effect on future employer contributions.  The projected employer contribution rates for the KERS Non-
hazardous pension fund determined by KRS 
 
actuary (considering the state’s past funding behavior) are 19.13 percent of projected payroll for fiscal 
year 2012 and 23.86 percent for fiscal year 2017 (KRS, 2007).  
 A recent report by the system’s actuary, Cavannaugh Macdonald, projects that if the state 
continues the trend of paying less than the actuarially recommended contribution rate, “the KERS non-
hazardous health insurance trust will be in default by the year 2013 and the pension trust will be in 
default beginning in 2021 to 2023 (KRS, 2007).”  
 
 
 
Table 3: KERS Non-hazardous Actuarial Requested and Enacted                                                                                                        
Employer Contribution Rates  for Fiscal Years 1993-2008 (in millions) 
FY Actuarial Requested Rate 
Enacted Rate 
By Legislature 
Requested Contribution 
By Board 
Actual 
Contribution 
Annual 
Contribution 
Shortfall 
1993 8.66% 7.65% $79.6 $70.3 $9.3 
1994 8.66% 7.65% $86.4 $76.3 $10.1 
1995 8.56% 8.56% $87.8 $87.8 - 
1996 8.75% 8.56% $91.5 $89.5 $1.9 
1997 8.89% 8.89% $98.5 $98.5 - 
1998 8.89% 8.89% $105.3 $105.3 - 
1999 8.03% 8.03% $97 $97 - 
2000 8.03% 8.03% $102.1 $102.1 - 
2001 5.89% 5.89% $78.3 $78.3  
2002 5.89% 5.89% $84.3 $84.4 - 
2003 5.89% 3.76% $89.8 $57.3 $32.5 
2004 7.53% 5.89% $120.2 $94 $26.2 
2005 10.29% 5.89% $170.6 $97.7 $72.9 
2006 13.62% 5.89% $224.6 $96.9 $127.2 
2007 17.13% 7.75% $283.6 $128.3 $155.3 
2008 20.15% 7.75% $342.9 $131.9 $211 
Source: KRS Actuarial Reports and CAFRs 1990-2006   
 22 
Figure B: S&P 500 Index and KERS Unfunded Liability Historical Trend 1975-2006
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Investment Returns on Assets 
The stock market decline between 2000 and 2003 had a major impact on the state pension 
system’s funding levels. The downturn caused investment losses on assets, which will likely increase 
the employer required contribution levels in the future. Figure B on the following page shows the 
historical trend of KERS’ unfunded liability with the S&P 500 Index.  Note the  
relationship between the two.  The unfunded liability reaches its all-time low and the actuarial value of 
the fund’s assets reaches its highest point when the market peaks. It is also interesting how the increase 
in the value of the assets lags behind increases in the market.  Since the graph shows the market index 
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increasing beginning in 2003 it is possible that KRS can expect an increase in its value of assets.  This 
is also dependent on the Board’s investment strategy.     
The investment strategy used by the pension fund's managers during the past decade may have 
contributed to the current unfunded liability.  To evaluate the impact of managers' investment strategy 
on KERS Non-hazardous pension funding level, I researched the investment policy and the asset 
allocation of the fund’s investment portfolio since 1990.   
 Bo Cracraft, Investment Compliance Officer with the KRS, responded to my questions 
regarding the system's investment strategy.   According to Mr. Cracraft, the fund's managers do not 
have any statutory restrictions on their investment policy.  When asked about the asset allocation 
method and caps he said that the Board conducts an Asset Liability Modeling Study with the assistance 
of an investment consultant.  Part of the purpose of the study is to set "target allocations" for the fund 
for each asset class (such as equity, fixed-income, and cash).  This establishes a limited range within 
which the actual allocation can fall.   
 In 1990, the managers' target allocation included 55 percent of U.S. Equity, 25 percent of fixed-
income securities, 10 percent of real estate, and 10 percent of cash.  Two adjustments were  
to made to the target asset allocation methods since 1990 as shown in Table 4 below. 
Source: Bo Cracraft, Investment Compliance Officer for KRS 
 
Table 4: KRS Target Asset Allocation 1990-2007 
Asset Type 
July 1, 1990-June 30, 
1997 
July 1, 1997-June 30, 
2000 July 1, 2000-June 30, 2007 
U.S. Equity 55% 65% 40% 
Non-U.S. - - - 
Equity - - 15% 
Fixed-Income 25% 27% 27% 
TIPS - - 10% 
Alternative - - 5% 
Real Estate 10% 5% - 
Cash 10% 3% 3% 
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From 1997 to 2000, KRS increased the target allocation of U.S. equity by 10 percentage points 
and fixed-income securities by 2 percentage points.  It reduced the target allocation for real estate by 5 
percentage points and that for cash by 7 percentage points.  In 2000, KRS made several changes.  The 
Board decided to set a target for 15 percent for international equity, 5 percent for alternative 
investments that would include real estate and private equity, and 10 percent for a TIPS portfolio.  The 
TIPS portfolio was added as a means to protect assets from inflation and consist primarily of U.S. and 
international government-issued inflation protected securities as well as commodities derivative 
contracts, cash, and cash equivalents.  
 It appears from table that managers had more of an aggressive investment strategy since they 
have a higher proportion of equity in the portfolio.  While this strategy allowed KRS to earn a higher 
level of investment returns on assets during the bull market, it may have contributed to losses in 
investment returns that could have been prevented had the managers used a more conservative 
approach. 
 
Benefit Increases 
In the past nine years, the legislature has enacted benefit enhancements for KERS Non-
hazardous.  In 1998, the benefit factor was increased from 1.97 percent to 2.2 percent for employees 
who retire between February 1, 1999 and January 31, 2009 with at least twenty years of service credit.  
This might explain why the number of retirements has increased in recent years.  In 2001, the 
legislature also changed the average salary used for determining benefits at the time of retirement from 
the highest five years of service to the highest three years of service.  Note in Figure A, that the time at 
which these benefit increases took place, the KERS pension fund was more than fully funded.  As 
discussed earlier, many states decided to increase benefits and reduce contributions during this period 
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rather than set aside the money to cover future shortfalls.  These enhancements have increased and will 
continue to increase the pension plan’s liabilities in the future.  If future investment gains are not 
sufficient to cover the additional costs, then employer contribution rates will need to increase.   
 
Analysis   
The extent to which cyclical market swings impact pension system funding levels can depend 
on the fund managers' investment strategy.  In addition, unfunded liabilities can have negative 
implications and impose burdens on pension systems and government operating budgets.  Considering 
this, I evaluate the impact of planning for cyclical market swings by using a different investment 
strategy.  I also estimate the amount of lost investment returns to date due to reduced employer 
contributions.  Finally, I compare two financing alternatives for addressing the system's unfunded 
liability.  Each section discusses the data and methodology used to answer each research question. 
The unit of analysis in this study is the KERS Non-hazardous pension fund.  This system’s 
funding levels have declined by a greater percentage over the past five years compared to the other 
four systems of KRS.  The system's health insurance fund is not addressed in the analysis due to the 
great complexities of health insurance in general, and for retirees in particular, coupled with the time 
limitations of this research paper. 
 
Investment Strategy Analysis 
In this analysis, I estimate the impact of the fund managers' investment strategy on the system's 
value of assets.  The research question I address in this analysis is: 
 What if managers had used a lower-risk lower return investment strategy? 
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Data 
  I use financial and sensitivity analysis to estimate the impact a lower-risk lower return 
investment strategy could have had on the pension fund’s current financial position.  Data on actual 
employer contribution rates, projected payroll, market value of the fund's assets, and the actual 
investment rate of return results on the system’s pension fund portfolio were provided in KRS's 
Actuarial Reports and KRS's Comprehensive Annual Financial Reports.   
Methodology  
 I determine the dollar amount of the actual employer contribution for fiscal years 1995 through 
2006.  I explain later why I chose this particular period.  Employer contribution rates are expressed as a 
percentage of payroll so I multiply the actuary's projected payroll for each fiscal year by the enacted 
rate to find the actual employer contribution.   
To determine the impact of the system managers' investment strategy on the value of the fund's 
assets I calculate the investment returns on the market value of the assets and employer contributions 
again for fiscal year 1995 through 2006 by adding the market value of the assets and the employer 
contribution for each fiscal year and then multiplying the sum amount by the fund's actual rate of 
return.  Then I added the investment returns for the fiscal year to the beginning value of the assets and 
employer contribution to get the value of the assets for the end of the fiscal year.  Then I used the 
current fiscal year end value of the fund's assets as the beginning value of the fund's assets for the next 
fiscal year and repeated the calculation for the subsequent years. 
I estimate the impact of a steadier investment strategy using a sensitivity analysis.  I analyze the 
change in the value of the assets in response to the change in the rate of return (investment strategy) 
from Kentucky's actual rate to the South Carolina Retirement System’s (SCRS) pension portfolio’s rate 
of return.  SCRS's strategy is appropriate for this analysis because until recently, the state had a 
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constitutional prohibition against the public retirement system investing in securities not listed on a 
national exchange. With passage of the State Preservation and Investment Reform Act of 2006 
increased the maximum portion of the fund that may be invested in equities from 40 percent to 70 
percent.  Therefore, before 2006 the state was limited to a more conservative investment strategy 
compared to Kentucky. Data for SCRS’s investment rates of return was not available for fiscal years 
prior to 1995 thus my analysis is limited to this particular period. 
Results 
 The results indicate that the value of the fund's assets are higher at the end of the 11-year period 
with Kentucky's investment strategy at $10.8 billion than South Carolina's lower-risk lower-return 
strategy at $8.12 billion, a difference of $2.7 billion.  One likely explanation for the difference is the 
higher return earned on riskier investments in Kentucky's portfolio.  Compared to SCRS, Kentucky's 
portfolio had a higher rate of return for almost every year except fiscal years 2001 to 2003.  This 
highlights another potential reason for the large difference in the value of the assets between the two 
strategies.  Since Kentucky's strategy is more aggressive than SCRS, the current managers' portfolio is 
more volatile meaning it is more sensitive to the market.   
 This important point is illustrated in Figure C.  Notice how the value of the assets varies more 
over the period with Kentucky's investment strategy than with SCRS' investment strategy.  The value 
of the assets under South Carolina's strategy appears to have a predictable and less variable trend, 
however, with Kentucky's strategy the value of the assets although more variable significantly exceeds 
South Carolina's strategy over the period.  Therefore, Kentucky would not be better off if it had 
adopted a more conservative investment strategy.  The results from this analysis are shown in tables 5 
and 6.  
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Table 5: Investment Strategy Analysis: Kentucky's Actual Strategy 
Fiscal 
Year 
Beginning Value of 
Assets 
Employer 
Contribution 
KY Actual Rate 
of Return 
Fiscal Year End Value of 
Assets 
1995       2,729,048,987              87,820,420  18.99% 3,351,792,907 
1996       3,351,792,907              89,524,654  17.63% 4,048,021,847 
1997       4,048,021,847              98,558,742  24.16% 5,148,394,459 
1998       5,148,394,459            105,265,461  20.76% 6,344,319,719 
1999       6,344,319,718              97,020,920  14.27% 7,360,519,947 
2000       7,360,519,947            102,167,019  6.41% 7,941,045,201 
2001       7,941,045,200              78,392,216  -5.41% 7,585,585,852 
2002       7,585,585,853              84,363,425  -4.30% 7,340,141,459 
2003       7,340,141,459              57,343,384  4.29% 7,714,836,943 
2004       7,714,836,942              94,083,590  13.58% 8,869,371,940 
2005       8,869,371,941              97,691,817  9.26% 9,797,413,862 
2006       9,797,413,861              96,914,778  9.68% 10,852,099,651 
Table 6: Investment Strategy Analysis: South Carolina's Strategy 
Fiscal 
Year 
Beginning Value of 
Assets 
Employer 
Contribution 
SC Actual Rate 
of Return 
Fiscal Year End Value of 
Assets 
1995       2,729,048,987              87,820,420  15.40% 3,250,667,296 
1996       3,250,667,296              89,524,654  5.00% 3,507,201,547 
1997       3,507,201,547              98,558,742  8.99% 3,929,918,139 
1998       3,929,918,139            105,265,461  15.06% 4,642,882,250 
1999       4,642,882,250              97,020,920  2.42% 4,854,608,827 
2000       4,854,608,827            102,167,019  4.77% 5,193,214,054 
2001       5,193,214,054              78,392,216  7.14% 5,647,998,958 
2002       5,647,998,958              84,363,425  0.91% 5,784,526,880 
2003       5,784,526,880              57,343,384  8.98% 6,366,470,214 
2004       6,366,470,214              94,083,590  8.79% 7,028,436,483 
2005       7,028,436,483              97,691,817  7.03% 7,627,095,120 
2006       7,627,095,120              96,914,778  5.11% 8,118,706,804 
Source: Data was provided in KRS Actuarial Reports, KRS CAFRs, SCRS CAFRs, and from the 
Bo Cracraft with KRS. 
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Figure C: Investment Strategy Impact on the Market Value of Assets of 
KERS Non-hazardous Pension Fund
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Lost Investment Returns due to Employer Contribution Reductions 
 In this analysis, I estimate the lost investment returns the system could have earned on 
employer contributions that were actually reduced below the required rate requested by the actuary. 
The research question I explore is: 
 What is the estimated amount of lost investment returns due to reduced employer contributions 
since 1995? 
Data 
 Data for actual rates of return were provided by KRS.  I calculated the actual and required 
contributions with projected payroll data from Actuarial Reports from KRS for fiscal years 1995 
through 2006.    
Methodology 
 To determine the system's lost investment returns (opportunity cost) since 1995, I multiply the 
employer contribution shortfall by the actual rate of return on the fund’s portfolio to get the lost 
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investment returns for the year.  Then I add this amount to the employer contribution shortfall to get 
the total lost employer contribution and lost investment returns for 1995.  Then I repeat this same 
calculation for fiscal year 1996 only when I calculate the lost investment return I include the total lost 
employer contribution and investment returns from the previous fiscal year because they could have 
been reinvested.  I repeat this calculation for each fiscal year through 2006.  Once I have the total for 
fiscal year 2006, I deduct the total of lost employer contributions for all fiscal years since 1995 to get 
total amount of lost investment returns for the period. 
Results 
The results indicate a total of $53.4 million in investment returns on assets were lost due to 
reduced levels of employer contributions since 1995.  This illustrates the importance of making timely 
contributions that are of the full amout requested by the actuary.  This amount represents about 1.4 
percent of the system's current unfunded liability.  Employer contributions are one of the three 
compenents of a pension fund's income.  This analysis shows that when contributions are not made 
employer's lose opportunities to earn investment returns on fund assets.  The results from this analysis 
are presented in Table 7. 
 
Financing Alternatives for the Unfunded Liability  
 In this analysis I analyze two different alternatives to retiring the system's current unfunded 
liability.   
 Pension obligation bonds (POBs) 
 A pension stabilization fund which would serve as an account for annual cash contributions    
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Table 7:  Lost Investment Returns due to Reduced Employer Contributions since Fiscal Year 1995          
FY Required 
Contribution 
Actual 
Contribution 
Annual 
Contribution 
Shortfall 
KY Actual 
Pension 
Portfolio Rate of 
Return 
 Lost Investment 
Returns 
 Total Fiscal 
Year end Lost 
Investment 
Returns and 
Employer 
Contributions 
1995 87,820,420 87,820,420 0 18.99% 0 0 
1996 91,511,766 89,524,654 (1,987,112) 17.63% (350,328) (2,337,440) 
1997 98,558,742 98,558,742 0 24.16% (564,725) (2,902,165) 
1998 105,265,461 105,265,461 0 20.76% (602,490) (3,504,655) 
1999 97,020,920 97,020,920 0 14.27% (500,114) (4,004,769) 
2000 102,167,019 102,167,019 0 6.41% (256,706) (4,261,475) 
2001 78,392,216 78,392,216 0 -5.41% 230,546 (4,030,929) 
2002 84,363,425 84,363,425 0 -4.30% 173,330 (3,857,599) 
2003 89,827,800 57,343,384 (32,484,416) 4.29% (1,559,072) (37,901,087) 
2004 120,280,040 94,083,590 (26,196,450) 13.58% (8,704,446) (72,801,983) 
2005 170,670,423 97,691,817 (72,978,606) 9.26% (13,499,283) (159,279,872) 
2006 224,105,182 96,914,796 (127,190,386) 9.68% (27,730,321) (314,200,579) 
       
Total Lost Employer Contributions and Investment Returns (314,200,579) 
Total Lost Employer Contributions 
  
(260,836,970) 
Total Opportunity Cost to date of Lost Investment Returns 
  
(53,363,609) 
Source: Projected Payroll was provided in Actuarial Reports.  With pension valuations, the valuation for each fiscal year is 
completed around the following November for presentation to the Board of Trustees.   
Source: SCRS Investment Rates of Return provided in SCRS CAFRs for Fiscal Years 2000 and 2006. 
 
Data 
The data for this analysis were based on interviews with analysts of the Kentucky Legislative 
Research Commission, KRS, and documents prepared by KRS’s actuary, Cavanaugh McDonald.  My 
assumptions regarding the bond issue and stabilization fund are based on the information gathered in 
my discussions with analysts. 
Methodology 
 I evaluate if borrowing to invest the POBs proceeds yields greater present value earnings than 
investing a cash annuity in a stabilization fund.  I make the assumption that the state has the option to 
issue $3 billion worth of POBs at a rate of 5.75 percent with a 30-year maturity.  I make the $3 billion 
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assumption since KERS Non-hazardous’ unfunded liability was $3.6 billion for fiscal year 2006 and 
the bonds are expected to earn income on the proceeds.  
Because POBs are utilized for interest rate arbitrage8 I determine the net present value by 
finding the amount I would have to borrow today at 5.75 percent to accumulate the same amount that 
the bond proceeds would grow to in thirty years if invested at a 7.75 percent rate.  First, I assume that 
the POBs would have issuance costs equal to 50 basis points and deduct the costs from the total value 
of the issue to get the present value of the POB proceeds net issuance cost.  Next, I found the amount 
the POB net proceeds would grow to in thirty years if invested at 7.75 percent using the future value 
formula. The future value formula is expressed as: 
FV=PV (1 + r) n 
where PV is present value of the POB net proceeds, r is arbitraged investment rate of return, and n is 
the number of years.  Then I discounted the future value of the POB net proceeds at the lower interest 
rate using the present value formula to find the amount I would have to borrow today at 5.75 percent to 
accumulate what the POBs would earn when invested at the higher rate of return.  The present value 
formula is expressed as: 
PV = FV / (1 + r) n  
where FV is the future value of the net bond proceeds invested at the higher rate, r is the discount rate 
or the cost of borrowing, and n is the number of periods. The difference between this amount and the 
present value of the POB issue is the net present value of the POB issue. 
                                                          
8
 Arbitrage in the case of pension obligation bonds means that the bonds are sold the employer invest the proceeds of the 
bond sale in riskier higher-yielding securities (Burnham, 2003). 
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 I also assume that the state has the financing alternative of creating a stabilization account for 
the KERS Non-hazardous pension fund to which appropriations can be made and the funds in the 
account can be invested.  I use the present value of an annuity formula to estimate the present value 
earnings of this option: 
PVA = ann [(1 – ( 1/(1-i)n ))] / i ] 
 
where ann is the annuity payment or annual appropriation to the account,  i is the rate of return on the 
investment, and n is the number of periods.   I assume that the annuity, ann, would be equal to the debt 
service payment made on the POB issue and the payments would earn 7.75 percent over a 30-year 
period.  I find the annual debt service payment for the bond issue using the straight-line amortization 
method.  Then I compared net present value of the POB issue with the present value of the cash 
annuity to see which had the higher present value earnings.    
Results 
 Evaluating the two financing alternatives, the present value earnings from the cash annuity 
payments to the stabilization fund are higher than the POB issue option.  The cash annuity option 
yields $2.44 billion in earnings compared to the POB issue’s $2.23 billion.  Therefore, the state can 
earn $211 million more from investing in a cash annuity than if it were to borrow and then engage in 
arbitrage using the POB proceeds.  The POB bond proceeds net issuance cost ($2.98 billion) would 
grow to $28 billion in 30 years at the arbitrage rate of 7.75 percent. The state would have to borrow 
$5.2 billion today at the lower rate of 5.75 percent to accumulate that amount.  The cash annuity 
alternative assume that the state would make an investment equal to the debt service payment on the 
POBs ($212 million) each year for the next  
30 years in a cash annuity stabilization account.  The results from this analysis are shown in Table 8. 
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 This analysis shows the that the state would actually earn more from making cash contributions 
to a stabilization fund than issuing the bonds and arbitraging the proceeds.  The arbitrage nature of the 
transaction associated with POBs makes this alternative more risky than the stabilization account 
option.  When employers issue POBs, they are assuming that they can earn a higher rate of return on 
the bond proceeds than they will have to pay in interest to service the bonds.  Market timing can be an 
important factor for the employer when issuing POBS since they are seeking the higher rate on the 
proceeds.   However, as I have explained, there is a great deal of uncertainty in predicting market 
behavior and there will be periods where the market is above the interest rate to service the bonds and 
periods where it is below that rate.  The success of a POB issue can not be determined until the bonds 
have reached final maturity when the savings are known.   
 In addition, there are implications that employers must take into consideration when issuing 
POBs such as its effect on the state's debt capacity.  If we assume that Kentucky's projected required 
debt service all projects was $885 million for fiscal year 2008 and the projected general fund revenues 
were estimated at $13 billion, the addition of the $3 billion POB issue with annual debt payments of 
$212 million would increase the debt capacity from 6.81 percent to 8.44 percent.  This increase in the 
debt capacity could potentially have negative implications on the state's borrowing cost as well as its 
municipal debt's credit rating (Hardin, 2007). 
 The stabilization account does not involve the risk of the POB alternative.  This alternative 
requires the General Assembly to appropriate money each year into the account so the contribution 
will earn a certain level of investment return on account's assets.  The investment returns earned on the 
account are dependent upon policymakers' decision to contribute to the account annually whereas with 
the POB issue the debt service payments are mandated. 
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Table 8: Financial Analysis: Pension Obligation Bonds versus Cash 
Contribution to Stabilization Fund 
Net Present Value of Pension Obligation Bond Issue Dollar Amount 
Present Value Cost of POB Issue $3,000,000,000 
Issuance Cost (54 Basis Point) 16,200,000 
Net Proceeds of Bond Issue 2,983,800,000 
    
Arbitrage Net Proceeds at 7.75% for 30 years 28,008,385,454 
Future Value of Net Proceeds    
    
Investment today at 5.75% for 30 years to accumulate Arbitrage Earnings 5,234,519,153 
Present Value of Future Value of Arbitraged Proceeds   
    
Investment to accumulate Arbitrage Earnings 5,234,519,153 
POB Proceeds 3,000,000,000 
Net Present Value of POB Option 2,234,519,153 
    
Present Value of Annual Cash Contribution to Stabilization Fund 
  
Present Value of an Annuity equal to the debt service paid with POB   
(Annual Debt Service payment for POB= $212.15 million) 2,445,720,751 
    
    
NPV of POB Issue 2,234,519,153 
PVA of Cash Contribution to Stabilization Fund 2,445,720,751 
Difference between POB and Stabilization Fund Alternatives -$211,201,598 
    
 
 
Policy Implications and Recommendations 
 In this section, I build on the results of my analysis by discussing the policy implications of 
each alternative and incorporate the recommended practices suggested by the Committee on 
Retirement and Benefits Administration of the Government Finance Officers Associations.  A more 
conservative low-risk lower return investment strategy can provide managers with a more predictable 
less variable rate of return on their assets.  However, if the investment strategy is too conservative a 
pension fund will lose opportunities to benefit from cyclical market upswings.  A more aggressive 
strategy which invest more in riskier instruments will allow the fund to earn higher investment returns.  
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The more aggressive the investment strategy the more likely the value of the assets will vary with the 
volatile nature of the market.   
 Because public pension systems are not identical the managers should adopt an investment 
strategy that has a level of risk that is favorable for that particular pension system's condition.  
Managers can limit the impact of market volatility, and thus risk, through diversification of assets in 
their system's pension portfolio.  Zorn recommends that governments consult with the plan's actuary 
and other analysts to determine the plan's expected rate of return, the volatility of returns, and the 
expected time horizon for achieving those objective.  Investment plans and strategies should be 
reviewed annually to ensure that the asset allocation is meeting the plan trustees' risk and performance 
objectives (Zorn, 1998).  
 In addition, failing to make employer contributions could reduce the level of investment returns 
on the assets in the pension fund.  This could increase the plan's unfunded liability and increase 
employer contributions in future years.  In times of budget deficits when other budget pressures can 
seem more immediate than pension funding most governments use deferment of pension funding as a 
countercyclical budget tool.  Deferment during cyclical budget deficits, however, requires the 
employer to offset the delayed contribution during surplus years when investment earnings exceed 
their target return (Peng, 2003).  The Government Finance Officers Association recommends that 
actuarially required contributions be made on a timely basis to ensure the plan's funding stability.  
According to GFOA, reduced employer contributions can constitute a threat to responsible funding 
(GFOA, 2005.)  
 POBs provide employers will an alternative to finance all or part of their unfunded liabilities.  
While the immediate availability of funds to pay off the liability is attractive, the consequences of not 
achieving the higher return on the POB proceeds than the cost to service the bonds can have serious 
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consequences as I have discussed.  Even if savings are not realized from the arbitrage transaction the 
government is still obligated to make annual debt service payments on the POBs.  When making the 
decision to issue POBs, a government should also consider the effect the issue will have on the 
government's debt capacity as well as its future borrowing costs (Burnham, 2003; GFOA, 2005).   
 Establishing additional reserve funds for a pension plan such as a stabilization account can 
serve as another source of income when investment returns on assets are lower than expected or 
funding levels fall below certain levels.  When investment returns are better than expected, funds can 
be deposited into a stabilization account (GFOA, 2005).  This account can also serve as a savings 
account where appropriations can be made to the account and then invested. Compared to financing 
with POBs a stabilization fund doesn't involve the risk associated with the arbitrage transaction.  
However, the success of the stabilization fund is dependent upon how responsible the state's legislature 
is with making the annual payments to the fund and not withdrawing funds for alternate uses.   
Discussion 
 Since an increasing number of public pension systems seem to be adopting more aggressive 
investment strategies (i.e. South Carolina) it should be expected that the funding levels of their pension 
funds will be more volatile as the cyclical market changes occur.  So how can this information help 
system managers and policymakers plan for the future?   
 If policymakers are educated about the market's impact on pension funds then in times of 
cyclical upswings when the value of the assets exceeds liabilities and pension funds appear to be more 
than fully funded, they should understand that the upswing is temporary.  With than in mind, they 
should not react to the pension fund surplus by increasing benefits or reducing their required 
contribution to the fund.  Instead, they could set aside part of surplus as in a stabilization fund for 
future years when investment returns will not be as high. 
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 Another valuable lesson that might be learned from this analysis is whether it makes sense to 
issue POBs during market downturns if the market is expected to recover eventually.  If the state 
decided to issue bonds during a market downturn, but then say we had another experience like the late 
nineties.  This would increase the pension fund's investment returns on assets potentially to the level of 
covering most of the accrued liability causing the pension fund to be almost fully funded.  But the state 
would still be making debt service payments for the POBs.  This is a pretty unrealistic assumption, but 
if one expects pension fund levels to mirror the activity of the market this is how they can apply that to 
making decisions about funding policies.  Before making decisions regarding funding options for 
pension plan obligations or benefit policies, a government should conduct a thorough analysis of the 
risks, implications, and costs of each alternative (GFOA, 2005). 
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Conclusion 
 In conclusion, the fiscal health of public pension systems is affected by cyclical changes in the 
economy.  This paper examines how managers' investment strategies can be used to limit volatility to 
market changes, the importance of employer contributions, and evaluated different funding alternatives 
to addressing unfunded liabilties.  The results indicate that Kentucky's investment strategy yielded 
higher investment returns to KERS Non-hazardous than if it used a more conservative investment 
strategy.  I also find that the system has lost investment returns due to reductions in employer 
contributions.  Finally, I compare the option of making cash contributions to a stabilization account 
with the option to issue POBs as a way to finance the system's unfunded liability.  I find that the 
stabilization alternative yields greater present value earnings to the employer.  However, POBs are an 
arbitrage transaction thus, their success depends on whether the proceeds can earn a higher rate of 
return than what is used to service the bond.  The success of the cash contribution alternative depends 
on the ability of the legislature to make timely payments to the stabilization fund.   
 A number of state public pension systems are adopting aggressive investment strategies.  With 
the decline in pension system funding levels and the rise of unfunded liabilities, more states are 
considering POBs as a way to finance their unfunded liabilities.  By educating policymakers about the 
influence of the cyclical nature of the market on pension funding levels, they can make better policy 
decisions related to pension benefits and funding.  
 40 
Works Cited 
 
2006 Wilshire Report on State Retirement Systems: Funding Levels and Asset Allocation. Wilshire 
and Associates, Inc.  
http://www.wilshire.com/Company/2006_State_Funding_Report.pdf Accessed on March 14, 2007. 
 
Burnham, James B.  Risky Business: Evaluating the Use of Pension Obligation Bonds. Government 
Finance Review (June 2003) 
 
Evaluating the Use of Pension Obligation Bonds. (1997 and 2005) (DEBT and CORBA). 
Recommended Practices.  Government Finance Officers Association (March 2005). 
 
Grass, Brad.  Personal Interviews.  February 2007. 
 
Gross, Brad.  Kentucky Employees Retirement System Funding. Internal LRC Document. (2006) 
 
Hanes, William H.  Concerns for the New Year: Pension Plan in Crisis. Member News. Vol. 25 No. 1 
(February 2007) pp. 3-5 
 
Hardin, Bart. Personal Interviews March-April 2007. 
 
Hustead, Edwin C. Determining the Cost of Public Pension Plans. Pensions in the Public Sector edited 
by Olivia Mitchell and Edwin C. Hustead. (2001) The Pension Research Council of the 
Wharton School of the University of Pennsylvania.  University of Pennsylvania Press. 
 
Hynes, Daniel W. Illinois Pension Benefits Lower Than Most States. Fiscal Focus Story. (Accessed on 
25 March 2007) http://www.ioc.state.il.us/FiscalFocus/article.cfm?ID=225 
 
Making the Pieces Fit: Kentucky Retirement System Comprehensive Annual Financial Report for 
fiscal year ended June 30, 2006. Kentucky Retirement Systems. (June 2006) 
 
Comprehensive Annual Financial Reports (1990-2006) Kentucky Retirement Systems 
 
Annual Actuarial Reports (1990-2006) Kentucky Retirement Systems 
 
Lamb, Robert, James Leigland and Stephen Rappaport.  The Handbook of Municipal Bonds and Public 
Finance.  New York Institute of Finance (1993) 
 
Livingston, Miles.  Money and Capital Markets. 3rd Edition. University of Florida: 1996 Blackwell 
Publishers.  
 
Mason, Joseph, Keith Brainard, Larry Langer, Parry Young, and Ann G. Ross.  Pensions and Other 
Retirement Costs: A Ticking Time Bomb. Municipal Finance Journal Vol. 25 No. 1 (2004) pp. 
47 
 
 41 
Mahoney, Daniel P.  Toward a More Ethical System of State and Local Government Retirement 
Funding. Journal of Public Budgeting, Accounting and Financial Management Vol. 14 No. 2 
(2002)  pp. 197-224  
 
Mattoon, Richard H. State and Local Government Public Pension Forum: A conference summary. 
Chicago Fed Letter.  No. 226a (May 2006)   
 
Miller, Girard, M. Corrine Larson, and Paul Zorn. Investing Public Funds. Second Ed. GFOA (1998). 
 
Public Fund Survey. National Association of State Retirement Administrators.  Prepared by Keith 
Brainard. (2002)  
 
Public Fund Survey. National Association of State Retirement Administrators.  Prepared by Keith 
Brainard. (2005)  
 
Pension Obligation Bonds: Practices and Perspectives.  Government Finance Review Vol. 12 No. 6 
(December 1996) pp.42 
 
The Gathering Pension Storm: How Government Pension Plans are Breaking the Bank and Strategies 
for Reform. .  The Reason Foundation (2005) 
 
SEC Sanctions the City of San Diego for Fraudulent Municipal Bond Offerings and Orders the City to 
Retain an Independent Consultant. Securities and Exchange Commission (Nov 2006) 
 
Snell, Ronald K.  Pension and Retirement Enactments in 2006 State Legislatures.  National 
Conference of State Legislatures. (October 2006) 
 
Snell, Robert K.  Alternatives to Traditional State Retirement Plans.  National Conference on State 
Legislature. (1997) 
 
Longer Lives and the ‘Lump-Sum Illusion’ Are Just Two of the Challenges Retiring Baby-Boomers 
Face.  Knowledge@Wharton. (July 2006) 
http://knowledge.wharton.upenn.edu/article.cfm?articleid=1533 
 
Useem, Michael and David Hess. Governance and Investments of Public Pensions.  Pensions in the 
Public Sector edited by Olivia Mitchell and Edwin C. Hustead. (2001) The Pension Research 
Council of the Wharton School of the University of Pennsylvania.  University of Pennsylvania 
Press. 
 
Willey, Frank. Personal Interviews.  March-April 2007.  
 
Young, Parry.  Managing State Pension Liabilities: A Growing Credit Concern. Standard & Poor's 
RatingsDirect. (Jan 2005) 
 
